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The stabilization program
I. Introduction
On August 8, 1958 the Turkish government announced a series of sweeping
changes in virtually every aspect of the foreign trade regime and in many
aspects of domestic economic policy. Consideration is given in this chapter to
the political and economic factors that led to the decision to change and the
nature of the changes. In Chapter IV the effects of the program are analyzed.
Some preliminary background is required on political developments prior
to 1958. The economic developments of the mid-1950's, reviewed in the last
chapter, had political ramifications long before 1958, and earlier political
developments were important in the evolution of the Stabilization Program.
It seems fairly clear that the Menderes government enjoyed strong political
support for its policies in the early 1950's. The Democratic Party was re-
turned to power in the election of 1954 with 57.6 per cent of the popular
vote, compared to the 52.9 per cent it had received in the 1950 elections. The
first signs of unrest came in the fall of 1955. Despite the fact that the
Menderes government had earlier appeared fairly strongly entrenched, revolt
broke out within Menderes' own party, with ten prominent members of
Parliament resigning from the party and joining the opposition. Consequent-
ly, the entire cabinet resigned; but the Prime Minister formed a new govern-
ment, the key change being the appointment of a new Finance Minister. Most
contemporary observers cited the government's economic policies as the basic
cause of the unrest.'
There apparently was considerable discussion within the administration
in late 1955 and early 1956 as to the policy changes which should be made.
Notwithstanding a speech by the Prime Minister in December 1955 when he
declared that "...we shall never consider any change in the value of our
money despite all sorts of propaganda to the contrary. therewas evident-
1. Eleanor Bisbee, "About-Face in Turkey," Foreign Policy Bulletin, April 15, 1956,
pp. 113-4.
2. Cited by Hershiag, op. cit. (Note 4, Chap. 1), p. 145, taken from Prime Minister's
Speech on Government Programme, Anatolian Agency (Ankara), December 24, 1955,
pp. 13-14.
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ly a serious devaluation plan under consideration. Several government offi-
cials interviewed in the 1960's recalled that a devaluation plan was prepared
and ready for adoption, with a new exchange rate of TL 6 to the dollar, when
opposition to the program emerged from within the Cabinet.
A series of changes was fmally made in 1956. These included: (1) the
special TL 5.25 and 5.75 rates for tourist and other current account transac-
tions; (2) the price control law; (3) increased export premia; (4) ceilings on
commercial bank credits; and (5) an increase in the Central Bank discount
rate to 6 per cent, contrasted with a rate of inflation well in excess of 10 per
cent.
These measures appear to have had some effect during 1956. The black-
market rate for the ha declined slightly, the trade balance improved some-
what in the second and third quarters of 1956, and the Central Bank's net
foreign exchange deficit was somewhat reduced. The wholesale price index
actually declined 6 per cent (part of which was a normal seasonal pattern)
between the second and third quarters of 1956, and there is some evidence
that the level of economic activity was somewhat depressed during that pe-
riod. Electricity production declined from a monthly average of 131 million
kilowatt hours in the first quarter of 1956 to 123 and 124 million in the
second and third quarters, respectively. Even the production of cement, one
of the most rapidly growing industries during the 1950's, declined by 10 per
cent between the second and third quarters, despite a normal seasonal trend
to the contrary.
The effects were short-lived, as evasion of the price-control law by the
private sector, increases in the money supply resulting from increased SEE
deficits, and abandonment of commercial credit ceilings soon transpired.
Political disaffection was evidently mounting by 1957 and elections were
scheduled. Despite increasingly restrictive curbs on opposition political activi-
ty3 and large increases in expenditures designed to woo the electorate,4 the
Democratic Party's share of the popular vote fell to 47.9 per cent. The Party
nevertheless won 424 out of 610 seats in Parliament, as changes favoring the
Democratic Party had been made in the electoral laws.5 Once the elections
were over the regime continued its ad hoc efforts to meet the foreign ex-
change shortage and inflationary financing of the SEEs continued.
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II. The devaluation decision
Given inflation, import shortages, retarded economic growth, a flourishing
black market, multiple exchange rates and constant arrears in foreign in-
debtedness, there can be little doubt as to the economic rationale for the
Turkish devaluation decision. However, all those phenomena were present
from at least 1953 onward. Inflationary pressure grew after 1955, but it is
difficult to argue that the underlying economic difficulties caused by infla-
tion and overvaluation were more massive in 1958 than in 1956 except in the
sense that those difficulties had continued longer. Then too, the import cur-
tailment of 1957—1958 may have made those difficulties more visible than
they were earlier.
It seems clear that Turkey delayed the devaluation decision long past the
point where most other governments would have taken action. When devalua-
tion did occur, The Economist commented
...Few countries have put off inevitable devaluation longer or with greater damage to
their economies than Turkey. For at least ten years the Turkish lira has been artifi-
cially valued at its parity of TL 2.80 to the dollar. Since 1953 the effects of this
overvaluation on the balance of payments have been partly but quite inadequately
cushioned by a cumbersome system of differential surcharges on imports and sub-
sidies on exports...6
Thus while it is straightforward to analyze the underlying economic reasons
for devaluation, it is much less easy to determine the causes of the timing of
devaluation or the factors that weighed in the decision. At least three separate
factors undoubtedly contributed to it: (1) the apparent disruption of domes-
tic economic activity, (2) domestic political dissatisfaction, and (3) pressure
by foreign creditors and donors. We consider each of these in turn.
Disruption of economic activity
Enough was said in Chapter II to indicate that the payments situation and
inflation had damaging effects upon the Turkish economy as early as 1954.
Import stringency became so severe as time went on that capital goods,
imported earlier, were left idle. Eren, for example, reported that:
Within ten years, the Turks plunged from an unequalled affluence to an unexpected
scarcity. Even coffee, rationed but available during the war, disappeared totally... The
cement mixer and steel for ferroconcrete were everywhere....The horns of trucks and
tractors broke the immemorial silence of the Anatolian plateau. But the sugar plant
in Erzurum starved for beets, the cement factory in Sivas was without coal, and the
6. The Economist, August 9, 1958, p. 468.r
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thousands of tractor owners in Adana and in lzmir scrambled in the black market for Political disaffection
spark plugs and batteries....
Export earnings in the first two quarters of 1958 were 40 per cent below
the corresponding level in 1957. By June 1958, with foreign exchange earn-
ings declining, no available sources of credit and mounting arrears, import
licensing ceased. It must have been evident that the situation could not con-
tinue without some sort of change.
An important question is the diagnosis of ills made by the Turkish leader-
ship. There are two possibilities. These gentlemen may have concluded that
import shortages were retarding growth and were the source of the problem.
Alternatively they may have become convinced that past economic policies,
including expenditure, finance and foreign trade issues, were ill-advised.
If the first interpretation is correct, additional imports were deemed the
sole requirement for eliminating difficulties and the government would have
adopted the Stabilization Program in order to obtain additional badly needed
foreign credits. On the second view, the 1958 Program was adopted in the
belief that the entire set of policy changes was necessary for Turkey's future
sound development.
The question of which interpretation is correct is important in analyzing
the course of events after August 1958. Unfortunately, no clear-cut evidence
is available. Dr. Sturc, who was an active participant in the discussion prior to
August 1958, clearly believes that the Turkish leaders were convinced of the
desirability of both devaluation and stabilization.8 If they did believe stabili-
zation to be an essential part of the program, the second interpretation is
valid. Others,9 however, take the view that the Prime Minister and his cabinet
reluctantly accepted the stabilization components of the program as a neces-
sary cost of receiving foreign credits.
It seems clear that the regime at least recognized that failure to take action
would entail further reductions in imports and regarded the probable eco-
nomic and political costs of such reductions as prohibitive. As such, the
economic dislocation and unavailability of additional foreign fmancing with-
out government action were necessary conditions for the adoption of the
Stabilization Program. Whether the government initially believed that the
stabilization aspects of the Program were desirable will be considered in
Chapter IV.
7. Eren, op. cit. (Note 5), p. 50.
8. Ernest Sturc, "Stabilization Policies: Experience of Some European Countries in the
1950's," Internat ional Monetary Fund Staff Papers. July 1968, p. 207.
9. Edwin J. Cohn, Turkish Economic, Social, and Political Change, Praeger (New York),
1970, p. 24.
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Political disaffection
There appears to be little doubt that large segments of the Turkish popula-
tion were adversely affected by inflation and import shortages by 1957—1958,
and were unhappy with the Menderes government. Although all commenta-
tors agree that political discontent had its origins in the administration's
economic policies, 10 they are not unanimous in their diagnosis as to the
aspects of those policies upon which criticism focused. The diagnoses are not
mutually inconsistent, however. According to Simpson,
There is considerable political unrest in Turkey today, and most of it is directly
traceable to the government's economic policies. Critics of the Democratic party
argue that the major evil is "planlessness." This point is in many respects well taken.
It is a fact that the government has never published a plan or even an outline giving
the impression that an orderly, balanced development of the country and its re-
sources was under way. As a result, there are cases of waste, duplication and the
misuses of funds, resources and manpower. Moreover, a sizeable number of Turkish
industrial projects have been undertaken, not for their own intrinsic soundness, but
for the political advantages to be gained...
Contemporary foreign observers agreed that economic conditions were at
the heart of political difficulties, but placed the discontent as originating
more from other aspects of the economic situation.
The biggest practical stick with which the opposition can belabor the government is
the serious economic condition in that country...The cost of living is rising and
supply shortages are acute...Coffee is nonexistent...12
Sturc's analysis is somewhat more subtle, and perhaps more plausible. He
argues that
It was only late in 1957 that increasing resistance to government policy became
noticeable. The Government had lost the support of some intellectuals as early as
1954, and it lost more after it had abandoned an abortive stabilization attempt in
1956. The Government believed, however, that the changed attitude of the intellec-
tuals was caused mainly by their dislike of certain noneconomic aspects of its pro-
gram..The Government overlooked the fact that the intelligentsia came to the con-
clusion that the sacrifices demanded of it were not yielding the expected benefits to
the nation as a whole.... The Government later found that, when the external supply
of capital goods on credit also diminished, it could still proceed albeit temporarily,
with infrastructure development projects, such as village water wells, irrigation sys-
10. Another factor leading to discontent was the increasingly repressive political meas-
ures taken by the government. See Nun Eren, "Turkey: Problems, Policies, Parties,"
Foreign October 1961, p. 97.
11. Dwight Simpson, "Turkey: Problems and Prospects," Foreign Policy Bulletin, June 1,
1958, p. 142.
12. The Economist, April 19, 1958, p. 223.68 The Stabilization Program
tems, roads, power dams, with the existing machinery. (It used military trucks and
bulldozers when civilian equipment wore out.) Construction thus progressed: there
were new roads, new dams, and new harbors, but no new vehicles on the roads.
Industrial consumer goods, based upon imported raw materials, also disappeared
from the market, and prices began to rise sharply. It was only when this stage was
reached that the Government came to accept the need for a stabilization policy...
In many regards, Sturc's analysis seems more appropriate than that of
those who argue thatpoliticaldisaffection caused the administration's
changes in policy. On his interpretation, dissatisfaction with existing econom-
ic policies made devaluation appear a viable alternative since there would be
little opposition to it. Civil servants' salaries were virtually unchanged between
1954 and 1959. The deterioration in their real income surely led many within
the government to react against inflation. But that would not have been
sufficient to bring about changes in the thinking of the political leadership.
The Menderes government was, after all, reelected in 1957; under the Consti-
tution, it had until 1961 before it would face the electorate again. Moreover,
despite the smaller plurality received by the Democratic Party in 1957 than in
earlier elections, the regime was firmly in power.
Role of foreign lenders
As evidenced by the amount of foreign assistance forthcoming in August
1958, the major foreign lenders and international organizations clearly sup-
ported the Stabilization Program enthusiastically. Devaluation had been urged
upon the Turks from at least 1953 onwards, but the
Government did not heed the advice from successive IMF missions and from OEEC
and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development that, in order to
attain its objectives, it must reform internal policies and adjust its trade and pay-
ments system so that exports could move again and foreign suppliers would be forced
by a more liberal import licensing policy to compete for the Turkish market.14
The fact that foreign governments urged devaluation as early as 1953 raises
the question of why they should have been successful in 1958 and not in
earlier years.
Foreign governments and international organizations had two related in-
fluences on Turkish economic policy in the mid-1950's: (1) some believe that
had foreign credits not been forthcoming in the early and mid-1950's the
devaluation decision would, of necessity, have been undertaken much earlier;
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Role of donors in perpetuating overvaluat ion.Perhaps the most forceful
statement of the view that creditor countries were largely to blame for per-
petuating the imbalance is that of the authors of the Columbia School of Law
study:
Although it is true that the international development financing has been a crucial
factor in making possible the investments of the past decade and the increases in
income to which they have given rise, it is also true that the Turkish inflationary
crisis could not have been prolonged for a period of almost eight years without any
corrective measures being taken, had it not been for the lack of coordination of the
lending policies of the Western countries.
While the availability of foreign credits certainly enabled the government to
continue its policies at lower cost than would otherwise have been possible, it
is difficult to see what action foreign creditors and donor countries could
have taken that might have led to an earlier decision. The World Bank Mission
to Turkey, for example, tried to discuss the inflation with the government in
1954 and refused to grant credits requested. The government's response was
to request the termination of the Mission in Turkey on the grounds that the
loan had not been granted and that the Mission had interfered in domestic
affairs (by mentioning the inflationary threat).' 6Evenif all Western coun-
tries and international organizations had withdrawn all support from Turkey
it is questionable whether action would have been taken much sooner. First,
the Turks could have resorted to bilateral payments agreements and other
arrangements with Eastern European countries even more than they did.
Second, the administration was certainly not reluctant to accumulate arrears
in indebtedness, so it would have required not only cessation of official
lending, but the Western governments' imposition of restrictions upon the
private transactions of their own firms to prevent the use of suppliers' credits.
Even then Turkey might have made fewer payments on arrears had new
suppliers' credits been cut off. Third and perhaps most convincing, the re-
gime's demonstrated lack of concern about the consequences of its economic
policies is virtually proof that total cessation of foreign credits would not
have resulted in a rapid change in outlook and behavior.
Of course the subject of what would have happened had there been no
international development financing can only be conjectural. At most, how-
ever, continuing foreign credits were one additional factor at the margin en-
15. Columbia School of Law, op. cit. (Note 14, Chap. 0,p. 164. The authors of the
study were Osman Okyar and Cihat hen.
16.Ibid.,p. 16.70 The Stabilization Program
abling Turkish economic policies to continue. The Turkish disregard for the
views of creditor countries seems striking, and it is doubtful whether anything
short of really extreme measures would have influenced Turkish policy.
Expectations of additional aid and donor pressures.It appears that until
some time in 1957 or early 1958 the governing body continued to believe
that additional foreign credits would be received if the situation became
sufficiently desperate. One factor leading to the adoption of the Stabilization
Program in 1958 was probably a reversal of that belief.
From 1955 onward the United States, the source of virtually all aid to
Turkey before 1955, became increasingly reluctant to extend additional
credits. The Turks sent several delegations to Washington and sought general-
ly to secure a large American loan of $300 million. The American government
did not act on repeated requests.'
Actual American aid disbursements exclusive of PL 480 shipments were
$68 million, $84 million and $39 million, respectively, in the years 1956,
1957 and 1958. Given the lag between authorization and disbursements (and
the large American loan of August 1958), these figures suggest that American
support was indeed withheld or diminished in 1956 and 1957.
There were undoubtedly political and military factors influencing aid to
Turkey. Early in 1958 the Turkish administration sent a delegation to
Moscow with the reported purpose of obtaining Soviet aid. Whether or not
this was an attempt to obtain aid from the Western powers cannot be judged.
It was subsequently announced that the Moscow negotiations had broken
down. The Economist concluded:
...They (the Turks) may be beginning to realize that if they do not put their house in
order, they may not get it ai'8
In July 1958 there was a revolution in Iraq. The pro-Western government was
ousted and Iraq withdrew from the Central Treaty Organization. To what
extent the resulting increased military and political importance attached to
Turkey influenced the aid forthcoming in August 1958 is an open ques-
tion.'9 Negotiations with respect to the Stabilization Program were undoubt-
edly proceeding prior to the Iraqi revolution. The fact remains that the Stabi-
lization Program was announced within several weeks of the Baghdad coup.
As explained by the authors of the Columbia School of Law Study,
.the situation from the point of view of external financing became desperate after
1954...Short term measures of a stop gap nature were resorted to such as the effort
to persuade the United States Government finally to agree to the demand for a large
r
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loan; efforts to obtain more bilateral credits from European countries, especially
from Germany; effecting imports on credit arrangements; making severe cuts in im-
ports of consumer goods and raw materials; and the piling up of new commercial
arrears by delaying payment on current imports. These were essentially stop gap
measures intended to make it possible to go along a little bit further with the policies
of expansion and inflation while hoping for something to turn up. The Government
probably did not lose hope for a large United States loan without conditions until
very late, only during 195 7—58. Import cuts, severe inflation at home and the price
control system introduced in June 1956 and later changed several times were causing
severe disruption in the whole economy. Devaluation and an attempt at stabilization
had finally to be carried out in August 1958 when the Government realized that it
could not continue to meet its most essential commitments and that large scale aid
would definitely not be forthcoming without conditions.20
The appropriate evaluation is probably that two preconditions had to be
met before the regime would consider the adoption of the Stabilization Pro-
gram: (1) the government could not obtain further credits without condi-
tions; and (2) the high and rising economic costs of import shortages had to
have become highly visible and increasingly politically unpopular. It is unlike-
ly that the Stabilization Program would have been adopted even then had it
not been for the wfflingness of foreigners and international agencies to extend
credit contingent upon the acceptance of the Stabilization Program. Whether
the government believed that the entire program was desirable or only half-
heartedly accepted it remains an open question.
III. Components of the program
On August 3, 1958 a decree was issued declaring that: (1) the foreign trade
regime would be changed; and (2) no international transactions would be
permitted until new regulations were promulgated. Hence except for a few
tourist transactions all international financial dealings between Turkey and
the rest of the world ceased. Import licenses were not again issued until the
announcement of the First Import Program at the end of September; and new
export regulations were not issued until early October. The initial impact of
the change, therefore, was virtually a complete suspension of foreign trade.
The components of the program emerged over the next several months.
There were essentially seven parts: (1) the de facto exchange rates were
altered and largely unified; (2) Turkish external debt was consolidated and
rescheduled and Turkey agreed not to use suppliers'-credit financing; (3)
Turkey received massive credits from international lenders; (4) a ceiling was
imposed upon Central Bank and commercial bank credits and upon govern-
20. Columbia School of Law, op. cit. (Note 14, Chap. I), p. 20.
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ment budgets; (5) the import regime was substantially liberalized; (6) the
export regime was altered; and (7) SEE prices were raised and price controls
were removed.
The first five parts of the package were announced in August 1958, al-
though debt consolidation and rescheduling was not completed for some
time. The export and import regimes were gradually liberalized over the
succeeding two years; and SEE prices were finally raised in May 1959. We
discuss each of these measures in turn.
(1)Thedefacto exchangerate
Turkeydid not alter the officialparity in August1958. Records of inter-
national transactions were kept on the basis of the TL 2.80-per-dollar
exchange rate until August 1960.2 1Asof August 1958, however, an exchange
tax of TL 6.22 per dollar was imposed on all imports, invisible expenditures,
and capital transactions.22 Tariffs were applied on the basis of the TL 9.02 rate,
thus making the devaluation complete, de facto, on the purchase of foreign
exchange. For foreign exchange earnings, a premium of TL 6.20 per dollar
was set for all invisibles, capital transactions, and exports other than those
indicated below.
Chrome, copper, tobacco and opium exports, which were subject to the
TL 2.80 exchange rate until the moment of devaluation, were granted an ex-
change premium of TL 2.10 per dollar, thus making the EER for those exports
—almosthalf the total value of exports in earlier years —TL4.90. Dried
fruits (figs, hazelnuts and raisins), which had received premia varying from TL
0.70 to TL2.38 per dollar, were accorded a uniform premium of TL 2.80 per
dollar. Thus while the exchange rate was unified completely for foreign ex-
change expenditures, the structure of premia on the foreign exchange earn-
ings side was simplified considerably but was not immediately unified.
Over the next eighteen months the premia on exports initially receiving
less than TL 9 per dollar were gradually raised: chrome was accorded the IL
9 rate in May 1959. The premia on exports of copper, raisins, figs and
hazelnuts were subsequently increased, so that by November 1959 only tobac-
co and opium were subject to a lower rate. The EER for these commodities
was increased to TL 5.60. Thus by the fail of 1959 only two export rates
21. Thus recorded imports, c.i.f., for 1959 were TL 1,315 million and $470 million,
implying a IL 2.80 =$1exchange rate even though no imports (except a few for
SEEs, see below) entered at that rate.
22. The one exception involved the earnings of foreign oil companies. Under the Petro-
leum Law foreign oil companies were assured that they could repatriate their profits
at the rate of TL 2.80 per dollar, regardless of the exchange rate, up to a certain
percentage of their invested capital.The Stabilization Program
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were in effect and all commodities except opium and tobacco were subject to
the TL 9 =$1rate. The tobacco rate was increased to TL 9 in February 1960.
Finally, in August 1960 the exchange rate was altered de jure. At that time
the diagnosis was:
-.Altogether,the main effect of the formal devaluation will be to relieve the banks of
a great deal of paper work which the premia systementailed...23
Paperwork
had resulted, of course, from the payment and recording for the
premia and for the foreign exchange transactions by different government
agencies.
Thus one can regard the 1958 EER changes, covering as they did invisible
and capital transactions, as a de facto devaluation accompanied, in effect, by
the imposition of export taxes on several commodities. Although devaluation
is generally thought to occur when the de fure parity is changed, the Turkish
case represents an instance when the de jure alteration was simply recognition
of a fair accom p/i. Thus we shall speak of the Turkish devaluation as having
occurred in 1958; the 1960 parity devaluation will be referred to as the de
jure change.
Three interesting questions arise with respect to the method by which
devaluation was effected. (I) Was there any advantage in doing it de facto
rather than announcing a de jure devaluation and imposing export taxes?24
(2) What was the motive for imposition of export taxes, or, more accurately,
failure to accord some exports the otherwise-uniform premium? (3) On eco-
nomic grounds, what can be said about the imposition of export taxes?
De facto versus de jure devaluation.The answer to the first question ap-
pears to be that on balance there were disadvantages to the de facto ap-
proach, although as events actually transpired, it made little difference. Ignor-
ing for the moment the taxation of exports, the effects on buyers and sellers
of foreign exchange of imposing uniform premia and taxes were identical to
the effects that would have been experienced under de jure devaluation. The
only conceivable defense of the method actually used is that it reserved for
the administration the option of increasing premia and surcharges at a later
date. The difficulty with that defense is that if the government was uncertain
as to what the new exchange rate should be it should have allowed the rate to
float. For the very act of imposing premia and taxes without formal devalua-
tion could have fueled (and probably to a small extent did fuel) speculation
23. EIU,op. cit. (Note 1, chap. II),No. 36, November 1960, p.6.
24. In 1970 the de lure devaluation was accompanied by declaring different exchange
rates for some export commodities; again, this was equivalent to the imposition of
export taxes. See Appendix C, below.74 The Stabilization Program
that there would be further de facto exchange-rate changes and thus slowed
reaction to the altered exchange rate. Since exchange premia and taxes had
been increased repeatedly since 1953, anticipation of further rate adjustments
was a reasonable expectation, and could only end with de jure devaluation.
By fixing the premia and surcharges the government gave one-sided certainty
to private traders and thus increased the likelthood of speculation on further
changes in the exchange rate.
The government's actual motive was probably not associated with uncer-
tainty as to the proper exchange rate. Although no evidence is available on
the point, the motive for the de facto approach probably lay simply in the
government's unwillingness to use the word "devaluation," especially after
past pronouncements on the subject.25 It is doubtful whether in the actual
course of events de jure devaluation would have altered the short-term re-
sponse to the Stabilization Program very much. In the longer run of course
the rate was altered de jure.
Export taxes.Quite aside from the manner of devaluation, there is the
question of the motive for imposing export taxes and of their economic
effects. Sturc, the only participant in the negotiations to write on the subject,
says that the main motive was to provide the country with "substantial
noninflationary revenue" since a sizeable trade deficit financed by foreign
credits was planned.26 It will be seen below that there was indeed a fiscal
impact from the premium system. Although the imposition of export taxes
for revenue purposes per se is ideally no better than a second or third best
policy, an economic and political rationale for some export taxes, imposed at
the time of devaluation and gradually reduced and eliminated, can be pro-
vided.
We note that as seen above the domestic wholesale prices of most agricul-
tural exports were generally well above their international levels before de-
valuation. Thus some exchange-rate adjustment for those commodities was
called for to provide an incentive to private traders to export at all. The
question is whether an exchange-rate adjustment of a magnitude sufficient to
raise the export price only to the level of the domestic price was warranted,
or whether all exports should have been accorded the new rate, thereby
increasing the domestic prices of those commodities. Since the exchange-rate
adjustments actually made were sufficient to raise the domestic receipts from
25. In the absence of evidence, it is difficult to reach any judgment on the subject, but
there is the consideration that the imposition of exchange taxes and premia is a
purely domestic matter. The government could have rescinded or increased the rates
unilaterally, and thus it did retain its future options. Whether this consideration had
any bearing on the manner of devaluation is unknown.
26. Sturc, op. cit. (Note 8), p. 208.
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By August 1958 crops were already planted and harvest was approaching.
It was impossible that the 1958 production of agricultural commodities could
be significantly affected by changes in domestic prices. Thus in the short run
there was likely to be little if any supply response to domestic price increases.
There is also an institutional income-distributional argument. That is, for the
taxed agricultural export commodities, opium, tobacco, figs, raisins and hazel-
nuts, small growers sell their crops to wholesalers against cash advances well
before the harvest. An immediate move to the TL 9 =$1rate would not have
been reflected in prices received by those producers during 1958. It would
have resulted in large windfall gains to wholesalers who had already purchased
the crop at lower prices and to the larger, presumably wealthier, producers
who had not yet entered into sales contracts. For the agricultural commodi-
ties which were effectively taxed, moreover, it can be plausibly argued that
Turkey had some degree of short-run monopoly power, given her share of the
world market in those commodities (see Chapter VII, below). Thus the export
taxes on agricultural commodities could be defended on optimal tariff
grounds.
Despite these arguments there was one adverse side effect of the lower
premia accorded to traditional exports of agricultural commodities: given
that all other exchange rates were adjusted, there was speculation that the
premia for the traditional exports would be increased. Indeed, as will be seen
below, it was precisely such speculation that forced fairly rapid adjustment of
the premia.
As to chrome and copper, it is difficult to find a satisfactory rationale for
maintaining the lower EER. Turkey's share of both the copper and chrome
markets was relatively smaller than her share for the major crop commodities,
and both minerals have close substitutes even in the short run. Exports of
both commodities had eroded over the preceding decade as domestic costs
had risen with a declining real EER. There could be no doubt that the erosion
was largely supply-induced, and that the short-run supply response to an
increase in the real EER for the minerals was likely to be considerably greater
than that for agricultural commodities. In fact, the government recognized its
mistake fairly early, as the EER for chrome was the first to be adjusted after
August 1958.
Thus whereas the imposition of export taxes on agricultural commodities
could at least in principle be defended as a sensible part of the devaluation
package, those on minerals were almost certainly a mistake. The effects of the
taxes on the short-run behavior of exports is examined in Chapter IV, below. L76 The Stabilization Program
(2) Consolidation and rescheduling of Turkish debt
It was agreed as part of the devaluation package that Turkey would nego-
tiate multilaterally for a consolidation of outstanding commercial debt. As of
August 1958 Turkey had cleared debts with United Kingdom creditors only
up to March 1953. Debts had been cleared up with other OEEC countries
until 1956 and 1957.27
By the spring of 1959 a debt repayment schedule had been agreed upon in
principle with the OEEC countries. The agreement covered all amounts due
to OEEC creditors prior to August 5, 1958. and payments due before Decem-
ber 1963 against previous capital goods imports. The total consolidated debt
was put at $422 million. Payments were scheduled to begin with $14 million
in 1959, rising $5 million per year until 1963, with the balance paid in equal
installments through 1970.28 Interest was set at 3 per cent per year.
Table 111-1 gives the scheduled repayments of consolidated debts and inter-
est.29 Since the prevailing marketrate of interest on international borrowing
was considerably in excess of 3 per cent, debt consolidation contained a large
element of foreign aid. If one assumes that Turkey could otherwise have
borrowed at 6 per cent (unlikely in view of her past performance) the present
value of the debt consolidation to Turkey was about $65 million, according
to the repayment schedule given in Table 111-1.
Official debt at the end of 1961, including consolidated debt, was esti-
mated by the Turks to be $690 million. This figure included indebtedness and
arrears not covered by the consolidation, additional credits received during
the 1959-to-1961 period and payments due the OEEC not covered by the
consolidation agreement. Thus it would appear that about half of Turkey's
1958 foreign debt and arrears was covered by the agreement. 30
In a sense, however, the chief value to Turkey of the consolidation agree-
ment lay in its permissive aspect: without consolidation it is unlikely that
Turkey would have been able to meet her international obligations and the
chaotic debt management of previous years would likely have been resumed.
A large part of the reform in the Stabilization Program was predicated upon
the Turks' ability to manage their foreign exchange expenditures and receipts
27. EIU, op. cit. (Note 1, Chap.II),No. 27, August 1958, p. 3.
28. The figures do not accord with those given in Table Il-i because: (1) only arrears to
OEEC countries are covered; (2) indebtedness to the OEEC not in arrears but pay-
able before 1963 was included; and (3) Table Il-i is in TL and the OEEC agreement
in U.S. dollars.
29. Debt rescheduling took place in the mid-1960's, so the data in Table 111-1 do not
reflect actual repayments. See Chapter V, below.
30. With $14 million paid in 1959, $19 million in 1960, and $24 million in 1961, the
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in a way which the chaotic arrears of the 19 50's had made impossible. To the
very considerable extent that the Turks succeeded, debt rescheduling was a
necessary prerequisite and had a value in excess of the $65 million interest
subsidy.
(3) Foreign credits
In addition to debt consolidation, Turkey received sizeable foreign credits
at the time of devaluation. These totaled $359 million and included a $75
million credit from the OEEC countries and $25 million from the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund. The remainder came almost entirely from the United
States.
An important question is the economic rationale for these foreign credits
or, stated alternatively, whether large loans were a desirable part of the Stab i-
lization Program. For loans received at the time of devaluation are typically
used to finance increases in the current flow of imports, which was the case in
Turkey. The question is whether increasing the current flow of imports over a
one- or two-year period has a sufficiently high marginal product to justify the
cost of the loan.
Although no answer can be given in general, it is the author's judgment
that the foreign credits received by Turkey in 1958 did have a marginal
product in excess of their cost. There are several considerations. (1) The
increased flow of imports was an important factor in eliminating inflation.3'
Part of the productivity of the imports, therefore, was in the improved re-
source allocation resulting from generally stable prices. (2) Given the reports
of bottlenecks and idle capital due to shortages of spare parts, the marginal
product of some of the increased import flow must have been extremely high
as idle and underutilized resources were available as complementary inputs.
This consideration is all the more important when it is recognized that even
31. See Table IV-6, below.The Devaluation.
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after debt consolidation, Turkey had virtually no free foreign exchange and
the import bill would have had to be reduced from its early-1958 level, at
least until mid-1959 when additional export earnings were received. (3) After
four or more years of import shortages there were inevitably once-and-for-all
demands for imports for restocking and catching-up purposes. Unless this
demand was satisfied liberalization of the import regime would have been
virtually impossible, and in the absence of the foreign credits the initial spurt
in demand could not have been met. (4) A large increase in imports was
needed to eliminate the premia on import licenses, even at the new import
EERs. Elimination of the premia probably had a large social product, as
entrepreneurs shifted their energies from seeking premia to other economic
activities. I
None of these arguments is quantitative, and thus conclusive evidence on
the cost-benefit ratio for foreign credits cannot be given. What is clear is that '
imports would have had to be much smaller in the eighteen months after
devaluation had foreign credits not been available. As such, the actual course
of events after devaluation would have been very different, and the large
increase in imports actually recorded was an integral part of the Stabilization
Program.
(4) Limitations on monetary and fiscal policy
A key component of the Stabilization Program was a series of limitations
accepted by the Turks on monetary and fiscal policy and the financing of
foreign transactions. One provision that requires little comment was that no
external borrowing could be undertaken except by the administration and
that all imports had to be financed by letters of credit. These provisions were
designed essentially to preclude the resort to suppliers' credit financing and
"thus gradually restore the country's shattered creditworthiness."3 2Suppliers'
credits did not again become an issue in Turkey's management of her foreign
exchange regime during the period under review in this study.
On the domestic monetary and fiscal side the Stabilization Program was
far more complex. Ceilings, to be periodically negotiated with the IMF, were
imposed on the issuance of Central Bank credit, the magnitude of commercial
bank credit, the amount of government expenditure, the amount the govern-
ment could borrow from the Central Bank and the financing of SEEs' current
and investment expenditures.
For 1958 (1) commercial bank credit was not to exceed its June 1958
level; (2) the central government budget was to be balanced, with a ceiling
(not publicly announced) on government expenditures; (3) agricultural sub-
32. Sturc, op. cit. (Note 8), pp. 208—9.The Devaluation-Cu rn-Liberalization Episode 79
sidies were to be included in the government budget; (4) SEE prices were to
be raised so that they covered current expenses out of current receipts, and
SEEs were to finance their investments only from their own resources or
other "non-inflationary sources" 33;and(5) the interest rate payable to bank
depositors was increased.
These restrictions were wide-sweeping and were generally well observed
during 1958, although the initial increase in SEE prices turned out in the
event to be inadequate to meet the provisions of the agreement, and SEE
prices were increased again in The restrictions amounted to a com-
plete reversal of government policy of earlier years. As will be seen in Chap-
ter IV, the effects, particularly of tight money, were quickly felt within the
economy. As evidence of the effects of the monetary restrictions mounted in
1959, the government weakened its adherence to various parts of the pro-
gram. In analyzing the effects of the Stabilization Program in the year imme-
diately following devaluation, however, the sweeping changes introduced in
monetary and fiscal policy must be borne in mind.
(5) Import liberalization
The August 3 announcement that all import licensing was to cease pending
the preparation of new import regulations caused all foreign exchange pur-
chases, with only minor exceptions, to remain suspended for several months.
For although the First Import Program was announced at the end of August
and went into effect in September, no import licenses were issued under it
until November. Since orders could not be placed until licenses were received,
and given the lag between orders and delivery, it was not until late in the
winter of 1959 that the flow of imports to Turkey began increasing. For that
reason alone no effect, except possibly anticipatory, could be felt from
import liberalization until the spring of 1959.36
33. In 1961 the government assumed the debt of certain SEEs, issuing 100-year Treasury
bonds as obligations against the General Budget. SEE debt figures are therefore not
comparable between the 195 0's and 1960's.
34.Annual Statement. Turk Sinai Kalkinma Bankasi, 1958, p.28.
35. Columbia School of Law, op. cit. (Note 14, Chap. 0, pp. 25 ff.
36. When deliveries did start in the winter of 1959, the Istanbul port very quickly
became unusually congested, which further delayed the delivery of imports to final
users. Two factors accounted for the delays: 1) the port's ability to handle cargo was
basically limited, with the port ordinarily somewhat congested; 2) the severe finan-
cial stringency resulted in some importers' inability to raise funds for customs duties
and other charges before they could land the goods. Those importers therefore left
their goods in the ports until the time they could raise funds to clear customs. In
some cases goods were left in warehouses until they were sold, whereupon the seller
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The Import Programs were the major regulatory tool for controlling im-
ports after 1958. Their characteristics are discussed in Chapter VI, below. We
concentrate at this juncture only on those aspects of the first few Import
Programs relevant for understanding the adjustment to devaluation and its
timing.
The total amount of the first three month program was $150 mfflion
which was over 40 per cent of 1957 total imports, thus implying a 60 per
cent increase in imports. The quotas were heavily weighted toward producers'
intermediate goods and raw materials. Of the $150 million total allocation,
more than two-thirds were for major items required by producers, including
allocations in excess of $10 million each, for vehicle spare parts, tires and
tubes, chemicals, iron and steel intermediates and petroleum products.37 It is
clear that producers' demands for spare parts, intermediate goods and raw
materials were deemed by the authors of the Import Program to be the most
pressing needs.
The First Import Program decreed that all import-license applicants would
be required to put up a 100 per cent deposit with the Central Bank against
the value of the license within a week of its issuance. Despite tight credit
ceilings, applications in the amount of $588 million were placed for $108
million of licenses to be allocated to the private sector. At that point it was
announced that 20 per cent of the value of licenses applied for must be
deposited at the time of application, subject to forfeit in the event the re-
maining 80 per cent were not deposited within a week of the receipt of
license. Applications against the $108 million allocation thereupon fell to
$116 million. 38 While the former figure, $588 million, gives some idea of the
degree of speculative activity following devaluation, the fact that $116 mil-
lion of applications were made within a very short time period, despite credit
stringency, is indicative of the degree to which Turkey was import-starved by
September
Subsequent Import Programs continued to emphasize producers' goods
and the increased flow of imports. Imports in the first and second halves of
1959 were $204 and $266 million, compared to $128 million in the last half
of 1958.
Other features of the import regime also changed. Import price controls
under the first few Import Programs were relaxed for some commodities and
abandoned for others. Import price checks were virtually a dead letter by the
time of de fure devaluation in 1960 (although some remained on the books),
and little use of them was made during the 1960's.
37.EIU,op. cit. (Note 1, Chap. II),No. 28, November 1958, pp. 1—2.
38.Ibid.,
39. The figure is all the more noteworthy in that the 40 per cent surcharge on imports
remained in effect until December 1958. See Table 111-2, below.
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In the 1956-to-1958 period state organizations had been given exclusive
rights to import certain "essential" commodities, which they then resold to
end-users. With the initiation of the Import Programs, private firms
allocated many import licenses directly, thus representing a shift toward
"actual user" licensing. This shift undoubtedly offset the impact of increased
import prices to many private firms, as the prices they had previously paid for
imported commodities were probably at least equal to if not greater than the
post-devaluation cost of direct importation.
(6) Export liberalization
It has already been seen that the exchange rates for major export com-
modities were gradually moved to the new exchange rate over the two-year
period starting in August 1958. Exports during that same period were gradu-
ally liberalized in several important regards. Most significant, many minimum
export prices were further adjusted to somewhat more realistic levels or aban-
doned during the 1958-to-l960 period. By mid-1959 the system of export
price control was fundamentally altered, in that exporters registered the
prices at which they were exporting, and the price checks for most commodi-
ties became ex-post rather than ex-ante. This change entailed, considerable
relaxation of the export regime as it reduced delays and uncertainties prior to
exporting, and frequently gave Turkish exporters 'latitude to enter into firm
export contracts without awaiting approval of the contract before signing
it.4°
Even for those commodities where minimum export prices remained in
effect, most observers believed that the prices set after 1958 were consider-
ably closer to realistic international prices than the prices decreed prior to
devaluation.4Thus even where the formal machinery was not abandoned,
the manner in which it was employed was considerably relaxed subsequent to
devaluation.
(7) SEE prices and price controls
In Chapter II it was shown that one of the major contributing causes of
the inflation of the mid-1950's was the failure to raise prices of SEE products
in the face of rapid inflation with financing of the resulting deficits by Cen-
tral Bank credits. Civil servants (including SEE white collar and managerial
40. The practice of prior price checks on exports was reinstituted in the spring of 1971.
Delays at port became so great that the regime announced as one of its goals for
1972 a target of 3 weeks rather than 3 months as the average delay in the approval of
an export price.
41. EIU, op. cit. (Note 1, Chap. II),No. 30, May 1959, pp. 5—6.
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r2. below.personnel) had received negligible increases in salaries since 1954, despite the
rapidity of the inflation.
Among the measures taken as part of the Stabilization Program was an
increase in the prices of SEE products, effected in the hope that the SEEs
would be able to finance their investments from their own resources rather
than with Central Bank credits. it was simultaneously judged desirable to
increase civil servants' salaries substantially. Thus increases in SEE prices had
to be sufficient to cover not only the existing costs of SEE products but also
the increase in the wage-and-salary bill.
Some price increases were effected shortly after devaluation, in August
1958, but these were insufficient to accomplish the goal. The major adjust-
ments in SEE prices and civil servants' salaries were effected in May 1959.
SEE prices were raised an average of 20 per cent at that time, while civil
servants' salary levels were raised an average of 41 per cent.42
Price controls over the private sector relaxed as SEE prices were increased.
Although the basic legislation enabling government controls over prices and
profits in the private sector was not repealed until 1960, price controls were
in fact lifted in 1958 and 1959 for all commodities except wheat, coal and
electric power.
It will be important to bear in mind these institutional changes and their
timing when evaluating the degree of inflationary pressure set off by the
devaluation and the short-term response to the Stabilization Program. Two
things in particular will be noted. The SEEs were sufficiently dominant in
enough commodity markets for the increase in their prices alone to be suffi-
cient to give a major fillip to all price indices in the second quarter of 1959.
Furthermore, the removal of price controls, even though they could not have
been completely effective, undoubtedly resulted in increases in at least a few
commodity prices. The official price indices, moreover, drew their observa-
tions heavily from controlled prices and ignored the existence of black mar-
kets in many commodities. Thus increases in controlled prices had a larger
impact on price indices than they did on the actual increase in the price level.
Secondly, the increase in the government budget in 1959 can be interpreted
only in light of the huge salary increases negotiated as a part of the devalua-
tion package. Ignoring the salary increases, the real expenditures of the
Turkish government in 1959 probably did decline from their 1958 level, so
that part of the increase in government expenditures can be interpreted pri-
marily as a "catch-up" in wages and salaries from prior inflationary pressure,
and was offset in large part by increased SEE prices and government tax
revenues.
42. Civil servants' salaries were increased by 20 per cent again in 1961. See OEEC,
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IV. Changes in effective exchange rates
The nominal devaluation of the Turkish lira, from TL 2.80 to TL 9 per
dollar, was undoubtedly one of the largest nominal devaluations effected by
any country since World War II. As already seen, however, many circum-
stances contrived to make the relevant magnitude of the change in the effec-
tive rate far less than the inspection of official rates would indicate. First, the
change was accomplished over a two-year period. Second, the multiple ex-
change rates which had developed prior to 1958 meant that the de lure price
of foreign exchange was considerably below the actual price, even on the
export side.
Table 111-2










Minerals 2.80 4.90 4.90 9.00
Traditional crops 2.94 5.14 5.14 6.77
Cotton 3.78 9.00 9.00 9.00
Marginal exports 5.00 9.00 9.00 9.00
Weighted export rate 3.17 5.87 5.87 7.76
Imports
Consumer goods 7.47 22.26 18.66 18.66
Intermediates and raw materials5.35 16.35 12.75 12.75
Capital goods 5.38 16.15 12.55 12.55
lmportswithdomestic 8.29 24.82 21.22 21.22
substitutes
Weighted import rate 5.94 17.90 14.31 14.31
Tourism 5.25—5.759.00 9.00 9.00
Other invisibles 2.80 9.00 9.00 9.00
Capital transactions 2.80 9.00 9.00 9.00
Notes:a) The weighted import rate was derived by using the percentages of total
imports in each category. For imports competing with domestic production,
however, judgment was used in deriving the weight. Weights used were: con-
sumer goods, 0.106; raw materials, 0.291; capital goods, 0.482; and imports
competing with domestic production, 0.121.
b) Data for capital goods imports are based on Table A-13 and do not agree
with Gürtan's estimates used in Table 11-10. Girtan's data give an average
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Table 111-2 summarizes the estimates of the change in nominal EERs. One
should recall that the nominal devaluation rate was 220 per cent. The weight-
ed export EER rose from TL 3.17 at the end of 1957 to IL 5.87 in August
1958 and to TL 7.76 in 1959. Thus the export EER depreciated by only 85
per cent in August 1958. And the weighted import rate was TL 5.94 in 1957,
jumping to TL 17.90 in August 1958, and falling to TL 14.31 by the end of
1958 when the 40 per cent tax on imports was lifted. Thus there was effec-
tive depreciation on the import side of only 140 per cent between the end of
1957 and the end of 1958. Neither of these percentage rates come close to
the nominal devaluation rate of 220 per cent, although both are sizeable.
An important feature of the changes in EERs is that the weighted import
EER was 1.87 times the export rate in 1957, three times the export EER in
August 1958, and 1.84 times the export EER in December 1959. Thus de-
valuation did not result, at least prior to 1960, in any narrowing of the
Table 111-3










Minerals 3.74 5.62 4.90 8.70
Traditional crops 3.93 5.89 5.14 6.54
Cotton 5.05 10.32 9.00 8.69
Marginal exports 6.67 10.32 9.00 8.69
Weighted export rate 4.23 6.73 5.87 7.50
Imports
Consumer goods 9.97 25.53 18.66 18.03
Intermediates 7.14 18.75 12.75 12.32
Capitalgoods 7.18 18.52 12.55 12.13
lmportswithdomestic 11.07 28.46 21.22 20.50
substitutes
Weighted import rate 7.93 20.53 14.31 13.83
Tourism 7.34 10.32 9.00 8.70
Other invisibles 3.74 10.32 9.00 8.70
Capital transactions 3.74 10.32 9.00 8.70
Note;The home goods price index for the first quarter of 1958 was set equal to
100, and the fourth quarter 1957, third quarter 1958 and fourth quarter 1959
indices were computed from that base.
Sources: EERs from Table 111-2. Deflators from home goods price index, quarterly data
given in Financial Statistics.oods price index, quarterly data
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differentialbetween export and import EERs. It should be borne in mind
that the import EERs are the prices paid if the import licenses could be
obtained, and therefore do not take into account the premia. Even so, the
fact that the Stabilization Program did not alter the differential against ex-
ports is remarkable. If data on the size of the premia were available, the
premium-inclusive EER differential would undoubtedly have been reduced
somewhat, although as will be seen below, it remained large in the 1960's.
Table 111-3 presents estimates of the PLD-EERs over the devaluation pe-
riod. December 1958 was used as a base period from which to make the
estimates. As can be seen, when price-level changes are taken into account,
the magnitude of the devaluation on both the import and the export side was
far smaller than even computation of the nominal EER suggests. Thus the real
export rate depreciated from TL 4.23 in December 1957 to TL 7.50 in
December 1959, an overail depreciation of 77 per cent in a two-year period.
On the import side there was a 74 per cent depreciation in the PLD-EER
between the end of 1957 and the end of 1959.
We therefore conclude that the "true" order of magnitude of the real
devaluation was probably about 80 per cent. While the basis of the estimates
is necessarily somewhat rough, the 80 per cent fIgure much more closely
approximates the magnitude of the devaluation than does the nominal ex-
change rate change.
Of course an 80 per cent devaluation in real terms is large by any standard
and is indicative of the severe dislocation of the Turkish economy in 1958.
Moreover the devaluation, large as it was, was only one component of the
Stabilization Program. Other components also represented major shifts in the
Turkish economy in 1958, and one would expect sizeable responses to them
on a priori grounds. In the next chapter, analysis of the short-term response
to the program is undertaken.
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